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**FINLAND'S SECURITY SOLUTION,
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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According to the Program of Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen's second Government the aim of Finland's foreign and security policy is to strengthen the country's security and international influence as well as to promote the country's interests in a world of increasing cooperation. The Government's main objective is the consolidation of relations with Russia, the Nordic countries and the Baltic States. It is a stated fact that the cornerstone of Finland's security policy is a credible defense and non-alliance. However, the Government is also strongly committed to a further strengthening of the European Union's (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the EU's ability to react to crises with its own military power.

The three Baltic States see NATO membership as a way to guarantee their safety and promote prosperity for their countries. Many other Eastern European countries are seeking similar solutions or have already joined NATO. Russia, on one hand, fiercely opposes NATO's enlargement eastward, while on the other hand is seeking cooperation with the EU. Sweden and Finland are the only Nordic countries, which are not members of NATO.

The Government's current written security policy on non-alliance is somewhat inconsistent with actual practice. Therefore, to guarantee Finland's security in the future, it must choose whether to remain a non-aligned member of the EU striving for a militarily strong European Union, or seek membership in NATO. In deciding the future course of action, Finland must take into consideration the contradictory objectives and security policies of its neighboring countries.

The thinking and reasoning of the nation's leaders and common citizens cannot be understood without knowing the history. The fierce, desperate, and often frustrating experiences of the past provide an understanding of the viewpoints and choices for Finland today.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FINLAND'S SECURITY SOLUTION, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE	i
ABSTRACT	iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	vii
LIST OF TABLES	ix
FINLAND'S SECURITY SOLUTION, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE	1
FINLAND'S SECURITY POLICY FROM THE INDEPENDENCE TO THE END OF COLD WAR ERA	1
KEY FACTS ABOUT FINLAND	1
THE EARLY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE.....	3
STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL FROM 1939 TO 1945	5
THE COLD WAR YEARS	7
NEW CHALLENGES IN THE 1990'S	10
TIME OF REASSESSMENT	10
STRENGTHENING TIES TO THE WESTERN EUROPE.....	11
CONCLUSIONS	12
SECURITY CONCERNs FOR THE FUTURE.....	13
NON-MILITARY THREATS IN THE SURROUNDING AREAS.....	13
MILITARY SITUATION IN THE NORTHERN EUROPE.....	15
RUSSIAN VIEWPOINTS ON THE SECURITY ISSUES	16
THE EU'S COMMON STRATEGY ON RUSSIA	17
FINLAND'S CURRENT SECURITY POLICY	18
TOWARDS A SAFER FUTURE	20
ENDNOTES	23
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	27

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1 EUROPE	2
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LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1 CHARACTERISTICS OF FINLAND AND HER MAIN NEIGHBORS AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES	3
TABLE 2 MEMBERSHIP IN THE PROMINENT SECURITY ORGANISATIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE.....	12

FINLAND'S SECURITY SOLUTION, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

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FINLAND'S SECURITY POLICY FROM THE INDEPENDENCE TO THE END OF COLD WAR ERA

KEY FACTS ABOUT FINLAND

Finland's area is 337,000 km², which is slightly less than the area of Montana. Its border neighbors are Norway (730 km), Sweden (590 km) and Russia (1,300 km). The length of the Finnish coastline is 1,100 km. The climate is cold but comparatively mild mainly due to the influence of the Gulf Stream passing the coast of Norway in the north. The population of Finland is 5,170,000. The main ethnic groups are Finns 93 %, Swedes 6 %, and Lapps 0,11 %. The

dominant religion is Lutheran although a tiny Greek Orthodox minority exists, additionally 9 % of the people are secular.¹

Finland according to the constitution is a sovereign republic. The legislative powers are exercised by the unicameral Parliament of 200 representatives, which also decide State finances. In the Parliament there are 11 political parties represented. The parties constituting the Government Cabinet are Social Democratic Party, National Coalition (conservative), Green Union, Leftist Alliance, and Swedish People's Party. The main opposite party is the Center Party.

Finland has a highly industrialized, largely free-market economy, with per capita output approximately equal to other Western European countries (UK, France, Germany, or Italy). The



FIGURE 1 EUROPE²

key economic sector is manufacturing, other industries include; wood, metals, engineering, telecommunications, and electronics.

One third of the GDP comes from exports. Finland mainly imports raw materials, energy (oil, gas) and some components for manufactured goods. Agriculture is limited to maintaining self-sufficiency in its basic products. The economy of the country has recovered from the recession of the early 1990's. Economic overheating was mainly due to the liberalization of currency transfers in and out of the country, and

depressed foreign markets. The volume of trade with the former Soviet Union decreased from 25 % to 6 % in the early 1990's.

COUNTRY	POPULATION (1,000)	AREA (1,000 km ²)	GDP (\$ p/c)	MIL EXPENDITURES	
				(% of GDP)	(million \$)
ESTONIA	1,430	45	5,600	1.2	70
FINLAND	5,170	337	21,000	2.0	1,800
GERMANY	82,800	357	22,700	1.5	32,800
NORWAY	4,480	324	25,100	2.1	3,110
RUSSIA	146,000	17,880	4,200	4 – 5 ³	N/A
SWEDEN	8,870	450	20,700	2.1	5,000
UNITED KINGDOM	59,500	245	21,800	2.7	36,900

TABLE 1 CHARACTERISTICS OF FINLAND AND HER MAIN NEIGHBORS AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES⁴

The geographical location of Finland has always had a dominant effect on the course of its history as well as the attitude and behavior of its people. Situated in the northeastern corner of Europe, surrounded mostly by the Baltic Sea, it is isolated from its western neighbor and the rest of the European continent. On the other hand the eastern neighbor, first Imperial Russia then the Soviet Union and now the Russian Federation, has always had great influence on the country's culture, economy, and especially its security policy.

THE EARLY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE

Finland gained its independence as a result of the First World War in the aftermath of the October Revolution in Russia. Finland saw the moment for its Declaration of Independence come in 6 December 1917. Soviet Russia, struggling with huge internal instabilities, recognized Finland's independence on 31 December 1917.

The future of the newly independent state was uncertain. A cruel civil war raged in the country during the winter and spring of 1918. With the help of German troops the so-called White troops of the government succeeded in disarming the Russians and the Reds led by the Left. As a result, deep wounds remained in the minds of the people for decades. The help provided by the German army created a military connection between the two countries. The Finnish army was organized and trained with the help of German officers, in spite of the fact that

there were many officers in the Finnish army, who received their military education in the former Imperial Russian army. The military help from Germany strengthened political ties between the two countries.

A formal agreement on peace between Finland and Russia was signed in Tartu in 1920. The agreement did not guarantee the peace along the border. From 1918 to 1922 Finland continued opportunistic and aggressive military operations in the East Karelia region, to free the Finno-Ugrians from Soviet Russian rule.

After the unstable and aggressive first years of independence, Finland sought to gain support from other countries. This support was needed to repel the inevitable attack by the Soviet Union. The countries in a similar position were Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The policy was called Border State Policy and led to no success. In the end the Finnish Government hesitated due to the fear that such cooperation would raise problems between Finland and the Soviet Union, which could have been avoided.⁵

The membership of Finland in the League of Nations in 1920 was seen to offer sufficient security guarantees toward the threat from its neighboring countries. The League of Nations gave Finland an arena to promote its own interests and to promote the issues of East Karelia and Ingria. Although agreed to in the Peace Treaty of Tartu, the Soviet Union had not kept its promises of autonomy to these regions inhabited by approximately 150,000 people of Finnish origin. Another issue was the dispute over the Åland Islands between Sweden and Finland. In neither of these issues did Finland receive sufficient or favorable help from the League of Nations.

After the failure to achieve its objectives through the League of Nations, Finland turned to the Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. The attempt was made in the name of "Cooperation in Neutrality". The goal was to form the Nordic countries into a neutral zone under military supervision. All the participating countries would be so closely united that an attack on one would automatically imply an attack on all. This attempt of cooperation, by the end of 1940, proved to be a total failure. Stalin attacked Finland and Hitler invaded Norway and Denmark. Only Sweden succeeded in staying neutral during the Second World War.⁶

Although there were difficulties in rationally discussing a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union a treaty was signed in 1932. The non-aggression treaty didn't solve the disputes between Finland and the Soviet Union. After the invitation for the Soviet Union to join to the League of Nations in 1934, disputes between Finland and the Soviet Union erupted. Finland thought it had the right to bring up the issue concerning the sovereignty of the Ingrians and East

Karelians to the League of Nations and the International Court of Justice in The Hague, since both the Soviet Union and Finland, were now members.

The defense policy of the 1920's and 30's maintained suspicion of the Soviet Union. Finland's attempts to remain outside the conflicts of the major powers were at odds with Stalin's policy. In Stalin's world impartiality was an impossibility. The way of earning Stalin's trust would have meant having Red Army troops stationed in Finland and that was something Finnish leaders would not support. In this respect the charter of the League of Nations was not favorable to Finland's attempts and supported Stalin's policy of non-impartiality. All the member states were obliged to take action against an aggressor and to permit troops to march through their territory.⁷

STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL FROM 1939 TO 1945

In 30 October 1939 the Soviet Union attacked Finland. The objective of the Red Army was to occupy the country within two weeks. After one hundred days of fierce fighting the war ended. Finland surrendered, but it was not occupied. The war was fought without any support from a major power. Nordic neutrality and mutual help did not work although volunteers from neighboring countries did fight with Finland on the front lines during the Winter War. The help in terms of men and materiel remained largely symbolic. The membership in the League of Nations did not help Finland. This lesson forced Finland to seek another forms of security as the threat from the east did not end after signing the peace treaty. Prime Minister Juho Kusti Paasikivi wrote in 1944: "The Winter War certainly earned us honor and reputation and the goodwill of the world, but it did not prevent it and it was not a compensation for the unhappy peace of Moscow."⁸

The fact of being isolated and the demands placed upon it by the Soviet Union, forced Finland to seek security with a new alliance relationship. The loss of the islands in the Gulf of Finland and shift of the border further to the west away from the Leningrad area had virtually no impact on Finland's security. As a result of the peace treaty a new threat emerged. The Soviet Union occupied the Hanko Peninsula. This put Soviet troops only eighty kilometers from Finland's capital, Helsinki. Additionally in July 1940 the Soviet Union demanded the use of the railroad from Leningrad to Hanko for the purpose of transporting its troops. This created a possibility for the Red Army to stage a coup, supported by the Soviet and communist sympathizers located in the region. This was an increasing concern to the leadership of Finland.

In August 1940 after German occupation of Denmark and Norway, Stalin incorporated the Baltic countries, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia into the Soviet Union. The Finnish reaction was

not to increase military readiness but to try and establish a bilateral relationship with Sweden. A Nordic alliance was out of question as two of the possible member states (Norway and Denmark) were already occupied by German troops. However, all attempts to strengthen a Swedish-Finnish coalition failed due in part to Sweden's cautious approach and Soviet opposition.

Three events during the summer of 1940 were to seal Finland's future. First was the demand to grant the Petsamo nickel concession to the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, Stalin issued an ultimatum to Romania demanding return of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina under Moscow's control. As a result, Soviet troops occupied the two areas and brought the Red Army within a striking distance of the Romanian oilfields, irreplaceable to the German Wehrmacht.

Additionally, the Finnish and German governments signed a trade agreement. This agreement allowed 75 percent of the output of the Petsamo nickel mine to be exported to Germany. The German war industry badly needed this ore. The dispute about the nickel in Petsamo and the surrounding area turned Finland towards Germany to seek support. Hitler, having decided to strengthen the German position in the Nordic region, provided Finland with political and military assistance. He informed Moscow that Germany would not accept further Soviet pressure placed on Finland. Negotiations were launched to supply Finland with German war materiel. The price for this support was to grant transit rights for the Luftwaffe from Turku harbor over the country to Northern Norway. Signing this agreement with Germany was a move towards dependence on German support against the Soviet Union. This did not happen intentionally, but since there were no other choices left, it was the only logical course of action. An indicator of the hesitation of the Finnish leaders to enter into a deep alliance with Nazi Germany was made through the repeated statement that Finland will fight the Soviet Union only if attacked. In case of war Finland will fight independent of Germany with the limited aim of restoring its pre 1939 frontiers. This course of action would be successful as long as Germany was victorious. Finland fought a separate war against the Soviet Union and by the end of 1941 recaptured the areas lost during the Winter War of 1939.

In the spring of 1944 the situation changed. Germany was withdrawing along the entire eastern front. The Soviet Red Army began to assemble a force of a little less than half a million men for a final strike against Finland. It was time for a Finnish peace inquiry. The terms from Moscow were unacceptable and the proposal was rejected. The consideration at that time was that abandoning Finland's only supporter Germany and concluding a separate peace with the Soviet Union under severe terms was unacceptable to the country.

The situation during the summer 1944 turned fatal for Finland. After the massive Soviet attack on June 9, German military assistance was vital to stabilize the situation. Hitler in turn refused to provide this assistance, if Finland opened negotiations for a separate peace. It appeared as if Finland and its leaders reached a dead end. However, President Ryti and the Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Mannerheim, developed a practical, but not necessarily prestigious solution, in an attempt to safeguard the nation's survival. On 26 June, Ryti wrote a personal letter to Hitler stating that he will not initiate separate peace negotiations with Moscow. Germany then supplied Finland with the required air support and anti-tank weapons. With this materiel Finland was able to stabilize the fronts.

As soon as the military situation improved a, new peace initiative was sent to the Soviet Government. After receiving an acceptable response from the Soviets, Ryti resigned on 26 July 1944 and was quickly replaced by Mannerheim. Mannerheim invalidated Ryti's letter to Hitler and opened peace negotiations with Stalin. A cease fire between Finland and the Soviet Union became effective on 4 September 1944. The most difficult stipulation for Finland was the deportation of 200,000 German troops deployed in Northern Finland. The agreement further obliged Finland to cede large areas in Eastern and Northern Finland; lease the base area of Porkkala near Helsinki; pay reparations; break relations with Germany; and accept an Allied Control Commission to ensure Finland abides by these conditions. Finland lost 2 percent of her population, over 1000 civilians died in numerous bombings, and 11 percent of the country's population was evacuated from the ceded areas.

The war ended for Finland when the last German troops were expelled from Northern Finland in April 1945. After all the actions, taken by the various Finnish leaders to secure Finland's freedom, they were finally successful. Finland remained an unoccupied and free western democracy unlike the three Baltic States and many Eastern European nations.

THE COLD WAR YEARS

In the autumn of 1944 President Mannerheim made a first attempt to alter the country's relationship with the Soviet Union. He sketched a draft agreement. This agreement would allow Finland to defend its own territory against any nation seeking to use Finland as a staging area for attacking the Soviet Union. The proposal was an attempt to convince the Soviet Union that Finland desired peace. Gaining the trust of the Soviet Union was fundamental, since there was no nation which Finland could depend on for assistance.⁹ The period from 1944 to 47 can be characterized as the years of danger due the constant threat of Soviet occupation or an internal coup by the Finnish communists.¹⁰

After signing the Paris Peace Treaty in 1947, public discussion about the new security arrangements with the Soviet Union were initiated. The main point was taken from the draft document written by former President Mannerheim in 1944. If any nation attempted to use Finnish territory to stage an attack against the Soviet Union, Finland would defend her territory and long as possible, and would ask for Soviet support if required. Under the negotiations with the Soviets, President Paasikivi defined the main objectives. Finland's military capability is limited to defending her own territory. Military aid could be provided by the Soviet Union only after joint negotiations. However, the text of the agreement contained no general political commitments for negotiations. Finally, Finland demanded that the right to remain outside the East-West dispute be stated in this agreement. In the final negotiations, held in Moscow at the end of March 1948, the Soviet delegation accepted all the changes to the agreement proposed by the Finnish delegation.¹¹

The military arrangements of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) were in the first two articles. First, if Finnish territory becomes the object of attack Finland will defend her borders with her own forces. Second, if needed Finland will receive aid from the Soviet Union in a manner to be agreed on between the signatories. The second article also goes on to state that if there is a threat of an attack, the parties concerned will negotiate prior to the actual attack. The treaty contains no other military clauses. In accord with Paasikivi's instruction its introduction includes an affirmation of Finland's intention to remain outside the East-West conflict. The treaty was in no way a military alliance requiring Finland to provide forces during peace time or war if a conflict occurred between the East-West.¹²

In 1948 the favorable opinion of the Soviet Union began to erode largely due to the harsh Soviet policies in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union clearly opposed a Scandinavian defense alliance but supported the Treaty of FCMA signed with Finland.¹³ The overall security arrangements in Northern Europe ended with Norway and Denmark joining the NATO alliance, Sweden remaining neutral backed-up by its strong military forces, and the specialized agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union. The Finnish policy can be characterized as a policy of cautious neutrality and pragmatism taking careful aim due in part to Finland's geographical location right next door to the Soviet Union.

Finland's security during the Cold War was strengthened in 1955 when the country became a member of the United Nations. In the same year the Soviet Union returned the Porkkala military base to Finland. The country's capital could breath easier after the withdrawal of Soviet troops located just 30 kilometers away. The membership in the Nordic Council in 1955 promoted Finland's attempts to maintain its distance from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw

Pact. The next step for Finland was to tie in economically with the Western European nations. Finland with the acquiescence of the Soviet Union achieved associate membership into the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1961 and into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. Finland remained an independent and neutral western democracy however, some politicians improperly sided with the Soviet Union.¹⁴

The treaty with the Soviet Union made Finland's disengagement from the Cold War possible. The first crisis, which tested the treaty, emerged in 1961 and is known as the Note Crisis. When the Berlin crisis intensified in autumn 1961 the Soviet Government proposed consultations with Finland, due to the threat of war in the Northern Europe. In this situation Finnish diplomats carried out another of their typical evasive actions. The Finnish Government did not engage in a polemics with Moscow but left without providing a formal answer. Instead President Kekkonen stated in his speech: "The best part of my political work is crystallized in the realization of Finland's policy of neutrality. My life's work is contained in it. To preserve and strengthen this policy I shall work till my last breath." President Kekkonen then went to the Soviet Union to meet party leader Nikita Khrushchev. He persuaded Khrushchev to give up these military consultations. Khrushchev realizing the situation announced his reliance on President Kekkonen's ability to uphold Finnish neutrality. The crisis was over and after Kekkonen's return to Finland stated: "The initiative for starting consultations rests primarily with Finland from now on".¹⁵

During the following decades Finland's position remained stable but restrictive. Any attempts by Finland to increase its cooperation with the West were carefully monitored by the Soviet Government. Finland's commitment to both the East and West were kept in balance in many ways. For example, military equipment was purchased evenly from both the East and West. Finland, however, refitted Soviet planes and main battle tanks with western electronics. Finland's activities in the area of détente in 1970's was encouraged and supported by the Soviet Government. This culminated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki in 1975. One Soviet attempt to deepen military cooperation became public in 1978 when Defense Minister of the Soviet Union, Dimitri Ustinov, during his visit in Finland, proposed common military exercises. The proposal was immediately, politely and determinedly rejected.

The Cold War situation can be summed up with six harsh lessons learned during the years of war and vague peace. Finland is a western state whose political, social, and economic family lies in the West. Russia is profoundly different and the Soviet system is inimical to Finland's deepest values. Geography ties Finland intimately to its eastern neighbor. Geography isolates Finland from the western community and it therefore faces Russia alone. Finland is a

small nation, however, its eastern neighbor is huge and can exert massive political, economic and military pressure against Finland.¹⁶

Tillotson, in his book, has expressed Finland's desire to secure its own future. The three wars which Finland fought between 1939 and 1945, two against the Soviet Union and one against Germany, had the effect of crystallizing a philosophy for maintaining independence. Finland should not depend on its friends nor on treaties for its defense and independence. Notwithstanding the FCMA Treaty, a policy for resolute defense of Finland's frontiers on land, sea, and air was maintained. This was accomplished in parallel with a foreign policy of consistently eschewing involvement in international commitments or disputes which might impinge upon Finland's freedom of choice of whether to become involved.¹⁷

When the Cold War ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it can be assessed that the chosen policies of the past to secure Finland's freedom and sovereignty were justified. Although limited in its freedom of action, the nation could remain outside of direct military conflicts, unlike Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Finland succeeded in maintaining its neutrality as well as to distance itself from the Soviet Union through international relations. Even during the intense Soviet attacks in the 1970's Finland maintained its neutrality. During this time the Soviet Foreign Minister actively sought to dilute and remove Finland's neutrality policy. It is clear that Finnish neutrality played a vital role supporting Finland's independence from the 1970's until the end of the Cold War era.

NEW CHALLENGES IN THE 1990'S

TIME OF REASSESSMENT

The collapse of the world's division into two zones forced Finland to a complete re-evaluation of its relationship with the Soviet Union. The process became perceptible in autumn 1990 during the visit of the Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev. In a rather dramatic setting, the Finnish Government declared unilaterally in September 1990 that the military restrictions of the Peace Treaty of Paris from 1947 were no longer regarded as valid. The references to Germany in the agreement from 1947 were obsolete. The timing of the announcement was selected very carefully. The declaration was made after Moscow had agreed on the unification of Germany but before the actual unification date. If Finland had waited any longer, it would have been the only European state whose sovereignty was still restricted by a post-war treaty. It was important from the point of view of the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union that Finland should

act alone, without consulting Moscow first, as if to emphasize that it was no longer necessary to consult with the Soviets.¹⁸

The earlier principle of compliance was not abandoned entirely, as Finland adopted an extremely cautious attitude towards the independence process of the Baltic States. Also efforts were made up to the very end to review the Friendship Treaty with the Russian Federation. The Finnish Government could be criticized for the slowness of its reactions. One should keep in mind that the basic concept of its foreign and security policy, of neutrality during the Cold War, proved very successful. However, it was time for Finland to look for a new foreign and security policy, although the strategy employed by Finland during the past decades proved successful.¹⁹

STRENGTHENING TIES TO THE WESTERN EUROPE

In March 1992 the Finnish Government declared that Finland's national interests would be best secured through its membership in the European Union (EU). Further the Government clarified its statement saying that in the new Europe, in which no cold-war division of the two camps exists, Finland's neutrality can best be guaranteed by not joining a military alliance and maintaining its own military force for internal defense.

However, the Government set a goal to apply for EU membership as early as March 1992, before the EC summit in Lisbon. This enabled the EU to discuss Finnish membership during the summit and to make it possible for Finland to enter the European Union in 1995. The timing was important for Finland due to the EU's decision that any new major defense policy decisions would not be made until 1996. In Finland the Government saw it as an extremely important point to be able to contribute to this developing defense dimension for Europe.

The objectives for Finland's national security policy were defined in three points: active participation in the EU, maintenance of stability in the north, and an independent national defense capability. On 16 October 1994 the Finns voted in favor of membership into the European Union. For the first time since the end of the Second World War, Finland was closely tied to Western Europe and it did so without having to face the fear of an attack from its still relatively powerful eastern neighbor.

During the 1990's Finland further committed herself to the West by joining NATO's Partnership for Peace program (PfP), becoming an observer in the Western European Union (WEU) and defining the interoperability goals with NATO in the Planning and Review Program (PARP).

CONCLUSIONS

“Do not rely on any external help and support, be flexible in your approach, maintain ties with the west, while still emphasizing the importance of good relations with your eastern neighbor and maintain the stability of the Northern Region.” These lessons from former President Paasikivi from late 1940’s and early 1950’s run deep. They are still valid today, although the world has significantly changed.

MEMBERSHIP COUNTRY	OSCE	EU	WEU	NATO	PfP	PARP	MAP
AUSTRIA	X	X	O		X	X	
BELARUS	X				X		
DENMARK	X	X	O	X	X		
ESTONIA	X	N	As		X	X	X
FINLAND	X	X	O		X	X	
FRANCE	X	X	X	X	X		
GERMANY	X	X	X	X	X		
HUNGARY	X	N	As	X	X		
ITALY	X	X	X	X	X		
LATVIA	X	A	As		X	X	X
LITHUANIA	X	A	As		X	X	X
NORWAY	X		As	X	X		
POLAND	X	N	As	X	X		
RUSSIA	X				X		
SWEDEN	X	X	O		X	X	
UKRAINE	X				X	X	
UNITED KINGDOM	X	X	X	X	X		
UNITED STATES	X			X	X		
OTHERS	37	7	6	9	27	11	6
TOTAL	54	15	10	10	18	7	3

TABLE 2 MEMBERSHIP IN THE PROMINENT SECURITY ORGANISATIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE²⁰

Membership in the various European and international organizations does not guarantee the security of Finland. The organizations which Finland has joined are either political or economic in nature and do not provide a military force to enforce their policies. NATO programs are only bilateral development programs without military commitments. Is the developing Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU an ideal solution for Finland in the future? Or should Finland commit herself to a deeper military alliance with the West by applying for NATO membership? Are there any other options to maintain peace and stability for the country and region? This decision cannot be made without examining the threats against Finland while examining Russia's interests in the Northern Region.

SECURITY CONCERNS FOR THE FUTURE

NON-MILITARY THREATS IN THE SURROUNDING AREAS

In the report by the Council of State of Finland to the Parliament in 1977 many non-military threats were seen and acknowledged by the international community. International terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, illicit arms trade, and proliferation of technology for WMD were recognized as new security problems. Additionally, illegal immigration, uncontrolled movement of population, environmental concerns, the threat of nuclear accidents and the struggle for natural resources such as water and oil were also seen as potential problem areas.²¹

Lea Ahoniemi in her study in 1999 has surveyed the current threat of Russian nuclear power plants.²² The most severe accident happened in Chernobyl in 1986. It had direct impacts on Finland in spite of being over 700 mile away from Helsinki. There are several nuclear power plants with similar or slightly improved technology closer to the Finnish borders. These are located primarily in the Kola Peninsula and on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland in Sosnovyi Bori, Russia. In addition there are Finnish nuclear power plants located in Loviisa and Olkiluoto. An accident at any of these plants will pose a serious health risk to the Finnish population.

According to the Finnish Security Police reports, Russian criminal activities have significantly increased in Finland during the 1990's. The Russians have concentrated on prostitution, the drug trade, smuggling, and money laundering. The new characteristic of this criminal element is brutality. Contract killing and the use of violence and torture are now a accepted customs.

Money laundering became illegal in Finland as late as 1994. The fight against money laundering was reinforced in 1998 when a separate investigation center was established, which also joined the Egmont-group. The Egmont group consists of similar anti money laundering centers from 38 different countries. Finland participates in the cooperation within the Baltic Sea Region Task Force on Organized Crime. The Task Force reported 186 suspicious money transfers occurring in 1998. This is an indicator of the amount of money laundering which is ongoing and known to the Task Force.

Drugs in Finland come from Estonia and Western Europe, mainly Holland. There are also attempts to use Finland as a transit route for drugs into Estonia, Russia and the St. Petersburg area. Finland has developed a close cooperation with the police forces of Russia and Estonia in an attempt to effectively fight these international criminal organizations.

The expansion of illegal immigration through Russia to Finland is also a potential threat. So far the number of illegal residents in Finland is minor due to the effectiveness of the Russian border control. In this area a close cooperation exists with both Russia and the EU. Additionally, the characteristics of the Finnish society (strict control by authority, a relatively small population, and a close neighborhood watch organization) do not favor illegal aliens.

A major threat to the wellbeing, security, and health of the Finns is the eutrophication of the Baltic Sea. The Gulf of Finland is especially vulnerable due to its shallow waters and the lack of flow of its waters. It is estimated that the situation in the eastern part of the gulf is critical. In this environmental endangered area, the Russian Government does not have the assets available to invest in the protection and clean-up of the environment.²³

The main source of the numerous non-military threats against Finland is Russia. Therefore, it is crucial for Finland to maintain a good working relationship with its eastern neighbor in order to diminish these existing threats. Cooperation can be conducted both bilaterally and through the EU. The European Union has developed a Common Strategy for working with Russia by establishing the following organizations: EU's Technical Assistance program to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), Council Working group on Drugs (CODRO), Joint Action Plan to fight organized crime, Northern Dimension Action Plan, and Multilateral Nuclear and Environmental Program for Russia.

The Northern Dimension (ND) is part of the EU's external and cross-border program designed with the specific aim to raise the EU's profile in Northern Europe. Finland as a EU member has actively contributed to the advancement of the ND. It is conceived as a way of working with the countries in Europe's northern regions to increase prosperity, strengthen security and resolutely combat potential dangers such as environmental pollution, nuclear risks

and cross-border crime. The concept for Northern Dimension addresses challenges opportunities which exist in this region. It is a means of identifying the interests of the EU in this region while establishing a consistent course of action. One of its main objectives is to create favorable conditions for EU enlargement without creating new - normative nor socioeconomic - dividing lines on the European continent. The geographic focus and concept of Northern Dimension is on the countries bordering the Baltic Sea and on the Northwest region of Russia, including Kaliningrad.²⁴

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE NORTHERN EUROPE

Despite its weak economy, Russia is still a considerable military power with her conventional and nuclear forces. In Northern Europe, NATO and her former communist super power foe (Russia) stand face to face, although the tensions have been reduced. Murmansk remains an important naval base for the Russian Northern Fleet. Despite the downsizing of its armed forces, its air defense system is still in relatively good shape along the Arctic Ocean coastline.²⁵ Norway on the other hand is still the only NATO country which has a common border with Russia. Although the global confrontation has decreased, economically vital fish and petroleum production areas between Norway and Russia are in dispute. This dispute adds a certain amount of military, economic and political tension between these two countries.

In the Baltic Sea region, Russia is still concerned about the security of her second largest city, St. Petersburg. During the Cold War the Soviet Union had under its control the southern coast of the Baltic Sea up to the Straits of Denmark. On the northern and western banks of the Baltic Sea, there were two non aligned nations Finland and Sweden. After the collapse of the Soviet Union only the small enclave of Kaliningrad situated between Poland and Lithuania remains a part of Russia. It is strategically important as a base of surveillance, intelligence, and power projection.²⁶ A military conflict elsewhere may easily destabilize this fragile balance in the Baltic Sea region.

At the same time Sweden, who until now has maintained a significant military power, is drastically reducing her armed forces. This is based on the assessment that there is no significant and viable military threat against Sweden. To defend the southern Swedish Baltic Sea region, Sweden will maintain and employ strong air and naval forces.

The border between Finland and Russia is peaceful. The domestic demands to reopen the negotiations with Russia to return the ceded territory have remained silent. The categorical denial of President Yeltsin in 1997 to negotiate this issue has contributed to the silence. The question is not also on the agenda of Prime Minister Lipponen's Government. Despite the

peaceful situation and the decrease of Russian military power in the region Finland maintains a remarkably strong military ground force. The threat is not seen as a ground attack by Russia against Finland. The Finnish Army must be prepared to ensure Finland's sovereignty and territory while also providing forces for deployment to the Balkans, or other contingency operations.

RUSSIAN VIEWPOINTS ON THE SECURITY ISSUES

One of Russia's foreign policy priorities is to retain its current diplomatic, military, and economic influence in the area. Moscow is also keenly interested in protecting its remaining vestiges of its superpower status by emphasizing the need to maintain its current offensive nuclear force and its role as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. In his mission statement on 28 December 1999, President Putin set out his main foreign policy goals. He sees the world as a multi-polar world with the aim to strengthen Russian security at home and abroad; nonproliferation and the control of nuclear and conventional weapons; the prevention of regional conflicts; participation in international peacekeeping operations; maintain its efforts against international terrorism and the drug trade. Russia's integration into the global economy, and interaction with international economic and financial institutions are the primary goals President Putin is striving for.²⁷

Russia's foreign policy is also concerned with improving its relations with key European countries. This will allow Russia to exploit problem areas between Europe and the United States. The president has frequently acknowledged the importance for Russia to greatly increase investment, trade, and credits from western nations and from international financial institutions. He is expected to downplay peripheral and marginal areas of dispute with the West while standing firm on issues considered to represent vital interests of the Russian Federation, such as NATO expansion into the former Soviet republics.²⁸

Russia is closely watching the establishment of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP will enable the Europeans to become a major international player in world politics within their own right. The Russian leadership seems to have taken the EU more seriously in this respect. In 10 to 15 years most of the former Soviet-bloc states will be members of the EU, which will include the Balkan nations and countries around the Black Sea area. The influence of the EU will become stronger in the Caspian region and in Central Asia, where Russian influence is vanishing rapidly. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is likely to disintegrate, and the new GUUAM²⁹ alliance will have more potential for growth than the CIS.

NATO will expand up to the borders of Russia within a couple of years. In order to escape political isolation, Russia has no other choice than to ally itself closely with the EU.³⁰

An indication of the Russian attitude towards the expansion of NATO is the sharply worded statement issued in January 2001.³¹ Russian Ambassador to Austria Aleksandr Golovin stated in Vienna that Austria should remain neutral. Any attempts to join NATO are against International Law and Austria's neutrality was based on this international agreement. Austria cannot unilaterally cancel the agreement. This statement by the Russian Ambassador makes Finnish politicians consider their future security arrangements very carefully. The fact that Finland has a 1,300 kilometers common border with Russia, may make it difficult for Russia to digest Finland's membership into NATO.

This assessment is supported by the discussion between Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and Prime Minister of Sweden Göran Persson in September 2000. Moscow generally welcomed the eastward expansion of the European Union, but was worried over its military component. Russia fiercely opposes NATO's parallel enlargement to the east.³² Mr. Janusz Bugajski, Director of East European Studies in CSIS, stated in Moscow in November 1999, "That it is in the direct interest of a democratic Russia to support NATO enlargement throughout Eastern Europe."³³

THE EU'S COMMON STRATEGY ON RUSSIA

The European Union has set the following strategic goals concerning her strategy with Russia. The first goal is to achieve a stable, open, and pluralistic democracy in Russia, governed by the rule of law and underpinning a prosperous market economy benefiting all the people of Russia and the European Union. The second goal is to maintain European stability while promoting global security and responding to the common challenges of the continent through intensified cooperation with Russia.³⁴

Derived from these strategic goals the European Union has identified its principal objectives. These are the consolidation of democracy; establishment of the rule of law and public institutions in Russia; integration of Russia into a common European economic and social environment; cooperation to strengthen stability and security in Europe; and to solve the common challenges on the European continent. The European Union will work to achieve these objectives by making appropriate use of all of its instruments of power.³⁵

The EU's main effort is the creation of a collective crisis management force to be employed by the EU, but under NATO command. "Cooperation with Russia in the new European security architecture will be developed within the framework of the OSCE as well as

by considering facilitating the participation of Russia, when EU avails itself of the WEU for missions within the range of the Petersburg tasks".³⁶ By the means of preventive diplomacy EU-Russia cooperation is enhanced to contribute to conflict prevention, crisis management, and conflict resolution.³⁷

The fight against organized crime is a common interest for the EU and Russia. In April 2000 the EU-Russia Cooperation Council endorsed a Joint Action Plan to fight organized crime. Close cooperation between Europol and Russian law enforcement is under scrutiny. In addition the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) subcommittee dealing with the fight against organized crime has provided a useful conduct for dialogue in this area.³⁸

FINLAND'S CURRENT SECURITY POLICY

The Finnish Parliament in 1997 defined Finland's security policy objectives in Northern Europe. First, to promote peace and stability, Finland strives to strengthen regional cooperation. Emphasis will be placed on the EU's Northern Dimension, and to control the consequences of NATO enlargement. Finland will follow the military situation and the changes in Northern Europe while participating in strengthening the security within the region.³⁹

Finland's goals in relationship to the EU and Russia are presented by Prime Minister Lipponen's Government on 15 April 1999.⁴⁰ The aim of Finnish foreign and security policy is to strengthen Finland's security and international influence, as well as to promote the country's interests in a world of increasing cooperation. Finland will continue to promote security in the world by strengthening democracy, its respect for human rights, and enforce the rule of law and equality. One of the Government's main guidelines is the consolidation of relations particularly with Russia, the Nordic countries and the Baltic States. Finland will pursue an active cooperation within the Nordic region and improve the cooperation with all of its neighbors.

The cornerstone of Finland's security policy is a credible defense capability. Under prevailing conditions Finland will best promote stable development in Northern Europe by remaining non-aligned. Finland will continue to participate in peacekeeping operations and crisis-management within the framework of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union and NATO's Partnership for Peace, placing particular emphasis on practical cooperation with Sweden and the other Nordic countries. The Government is also strongly committed to a further strengthening the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Union's ability to react to crises which threaten security and stability in the region and is in accordance with the Treaty of Amsterdam.⁴¹

In the Government's program it is written that Finland makes full use of the possibilities offered by the European Union to promote European cooperation in accordance with the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and market economy as well as respect for human rights. The Government will seek to strengthen the functioning of the European Union so that it will be better placed to face the challenges posed by globalization and to promote security, stable economic development, employment, equality, environmental protection, and social justice.⁴²

The Government is committed to strengthening the European Union as an international political and economic actor and aims at institutional reforms which are durable. The Government will adopt an active stance in pressing for an improvement in the internal security of the Union and in the rights of its citizens as an area of freedom, security, and justice. Further, the Government will actively seek to support the European Union's policy with regard to the northern areas of Europe and its relationship with Russia. It will be committed to the full implementation of the EU's policy on the Northern port of Europe. The Finnish Government supports the enlargement of the European Union and will act to promote the membership of additional countries into the European Union.⁴³

The position of the Government in Finland with respect to the development of EU's crisis management capability is strongly criticized. One of the major opponents is Mr. Esko Seppänen, a vocal member of the European Parliament. He is also a member of the Leftist Party, one of the parties in Prime Minister Lipponen's coalition cabinet. He has stated that the creation of an Euro-Army is only a step towards the Federal Union of Europe, to which the Finnish people have not committed themselves.⁴⁴ The viewpoints of the President and Prime Minister of Finland are somewhat different in respect with the EU. Prime Minister Lipponen is committed to the strengthening of the EU. President Halonen sees an increased military alliance between the EU and Finland a risk. It may lead to a confusion of nations seeing a difference between the EU and NATO.⁴⁵ A concerned comment has been expressed earlier this year by the Foreign Minister of Finland, Mr. Erkki Tuomioja. The preparations of the common security policy of the EU are advancing too quickly. This tempo is being set by the major member states at the expense of its smaller states. There are things to carefully consider, among those are the missions that the EU troops will be committed to and specifically, where these forces can be deployed.⁴⁶

Prof. Alpo Rusi, a former Political Advisor to President Ahtisaari, has strongly criticized the cautious approach to NATO membership of Finland. He has recently stated that while the EU

expands and NATO enlargements advance eastward, Finland must strengthen the EU and must also consider joining NATO. This would increase Finland's freedom of action and security.⁴⁷

The relationships between Finland, Russia and the EU have created a dialogue between the President of Finland and the opposition Center Party leader, Ms. Anneli Jäättänenmäki. She, among other commentators, has said that Finland's policy toward Russia has been overshadowed by the EU. The President's statement concerning the EU was that the EU is not being developed as an organization for collective defense. Instead, she said that the EU and NATO should develop their cooperation for crisis management. "I take a suspicious view of forecasts according to which the development of the EU's security and defense policies and crisis management capabilities could push NATO to the side."⁴⁸ These comments further add friction between the President and the Prime Minister.

The participation in the EU and NATO is extremely sensitive and at times not even allowed to be discussed among the high-ranking leaders of the Finnish Defence Forces. The Chief of Defence GEN Hägglund in an interview in August 2000 stated that in his mind the EU is trying to develop a defense policy, which should not be a substitute for NATO. The process should not strain the relations between the EU and United States. However, his firm opinion is that no one else but the Finns should defend Finland. Besides, there are no guarantees that anyone else would be interested in doing this.⁴⁹

Although the EU's policy on Russia is consistent with the policies of Finland there are some points of concern. Finland in committing herself to a close association with NATO may endanger her relations with Russia.

TOWARDS A SAFER FUTURE

Before summing up the security and political choices for the future, it is important to remind the reader of a geographical factor, which still exists. Finland has 1,300 km common border with Russia. Additionally the Baltic Sea effectively isolates Finland from the rest of the European continent. The long and violent history has also created a pragmatic approach to the way the Finns conduct security policy. The security of the nation comes first, and the best possible way to accomplish this must be chosen. The policy selected may not always receive acceptance or respect from the outside world, as was the term Finlandierung⁵⁰ understood and accepted by the West during the Cold War indicates. The manner in which Finland broke away from Germany in 1944 made the Finnish leadership appear as if they were splitting hairs. Mannerheim immediately proclaimed in July 1944, that former President Ryti's written commitment to Hitler signed in the spring of 1944 not binding since Ryti resigned from office.

Keeping Finland's history and these lessons in perspective the option to rely on non-alliance and to keep the country outside of disputes and conflicts is no longer sufficient. Although it may ultimately remain as the last choice available. Today's Finland is politically and economically tied to Europe. Isolationism in the global environment is not relevant. Non-alliance will leave Finland vulnerable against the actions from both the east and west. From the Russian point of view they must ensure that Finland cannot be used as a transit route by hostile forces. According to the charter of the European Union member states are committed to a common foreign and security policy. Staying outside this decision making mechanism would also mean separation from the EU. This might give the wrong signal that Finland is not willing to belong to the West and is still under the influence of Russia.

At the other end of pendulum is the option for Finland to join NATO. The difficulty of becoming a NATO member is expressed in the way the political leaders of Finland are arguing over the issue. The Cold War and harsh lessons learned during WW II are strongly influencing the opinions. The discussion to a great extent is based on emotions and therefore reasonable dialogue does not always enter into the equation. In the debate the fact that nations cannot just join NATO by only signing up is ignored. The member countries of NATO must decide, whether the applicant can fulfil the obligations of the membership. Additionally, the expansion of NATO to the east is not necessarily the desire of the current member states. In accepting Finland's application to join NATO, it inherits 1,300 km common border with Russia, which fiercely contests the expansion of NATO eastward. On the other hand, Finland is an integral part of the Western Europe through its membership in the EU. NATO's Planning and Preview Process enables the improvement in the interoperability of the Finnish Defence Forces to a level equal to the other Western European military forces. Currently eleven member states of the EU also belong to NATO. If a crisis occurs the members of these two organizations are more or less involved in the security of each other. This arrangement does not however guarantee Finland's security. It is obvious that the country's defense capability cannot be built on this basis. As a final point, in the 5th article of the Treaty of Washington it states that member states of NATO will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.⁵¹ In this light not even membership would guarantee an all-embracing security arrangement.

From the 1990's the European Union has adopted the Common Foreign and Security Policy and developed a Common Strategy on Russia. The first policy securely ties Finland to Western Europe. Of the two choices membership in the EU promotes the best overall peace

and stability in Northern Europe especially in the context of the EU's Northern Dimension program. This viewpoint is vital when Finland defines its optimum course of action. The military threat in Northern Europe remains fairly low. Social, economic and environmental problems across the border in Russia are huge and may endanger the security and wellbeing of the people on both sides of the border. Therefore, aid to Russia to help solve these problems without angering Russia through NATO membership offers Finland the best means to promote peace and stability in the region.

Military confrontation and suspicion towards Finland's ability and willingness to prevent attacks against Russia were one of the main reasons Stalin and his successors tightly controlled Finland's freedom of action. Cooperation through the EU is less problematic for Finland and Russia. The EU's economic capability in concert with NATO's military capability provides Finland to a certain extent a reasonable security guarantee. The deterrence given Finland's position in the EU will be strong enough to keep the country outside of a conflict. From Finland's viewpoint the arrangement is worthwhile, for it prevents Finland from seeking an unfavorable alliance and it does not raise tension in the region.

WORD COUNT 8880

ENDNOTES

¹ "The World Factbook 2000," available from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/>; Internet; accessed 30 January 2001.

² "The World Factbook 2000," available from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/reference/JPEG%20versions/>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2001.

³ Jan Lejonhjelm, Some Economic Factors in a Russian Security Perspective, Russia's Security Political Prospects, Strategian tutkimusselosteita, julkaisusarja 2, n:o 5 (Helsinki: Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, 1998), 47. According to Lejonhjelm widely differing results about the size of the real defense budget of Russia exist. Western institutions like SIPRI, ACDA, and IISS vary in their estimates between 4.5 to 10 per cent of GDP, while some Russian analysts claim a figure at least twice as high or 20-25 per cent of GDP. World Bank's statistics from 1997 show the figure 5.8.

⁴ "The World Factbook 2000,"

⁵ Risto E. J. Penttilä, Finland's Security in a Changing Europe: A Historical Perspective, Finnish Defence Studies 7 (Helsinki: National Defence College, 1994), 14.

⁶ Penttilä, 14.

⁷ Timo Vihavainen, "Before the War. Finland, Stalin, and Germany in 1930's," available from <http://www.finland.org>; Internet; accessed 19 September 2000.

⁸ H.M. Tillotson, Finland at Peace and War (Guildford, Great Britain: Biddles Ltd, 1996), 179.

⁹ Max Jakobson and Jukka Tarkka, Finland's Security Policy after the Second World War, Aspects of Security, the Case of Independent Finland (Vaasa: Commission Finlandaise d'Histoire Militaire, 1985), 241.

¹⁰ Risto E. J. Penttilä, Finland's Search for Security through Defence, 1944-89, (Worcester, Great Britain: Billing & Sons Ltd, 1991), 6.

¹¹ Jakobson and Tarkka, 249.

¹² Tillotson, 322-323.

¹³ Pekka Visuri, Evolution of the Finnish Military Doctrine 1945-1985, Finnish Defence Studies 1 (Helsinki: War College, 1990), 8.

¹⁴ Timo Vihavainen, "After the War: Finland's relations with the Soviet Union 1944 - 1991," available from <http://www.finland.org>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2001.

¹⁵ Jakobson and Tarkka, 257.

¹⁶ Tomas Ries, "Lessons of the Winter War - yesterday and today," available from <<http://www.finland.org>>; Internet; accessed 19 September 2000.

¹⁷ Tillotson, 251.

¹⁸ Penttilä, Finland's Security in a Changing Europe: A Historical Perspective, 22.

¹⁹ Penttilä, Finland's Security in a Changing Europe: A Historical Perspective, 22-23.

²⁰ Kaisa Heikkilä, Suomi ja NATO:n rauhankumppanuusohjelma, Pääesikunnan kansainvälisen osaston julkaisuja 2/2000 (Vaasa, Pääesikunta/Kansainvälinen osasto, 2000), 156-157. Legend for the table is following: x full member, a applicant, as associated member, o observer, n negotiating for the membership. The row OTHERS indicates the number of other full members.

²¹ Euroopan turvallisuuskehitys ja Suomen puolustus. Valtioneuvoston selonteko eduskunnalle 17.3.1997 (Helsinki: Valtioneuvosto, maaliskuu 1997), 14-15.

²² Lea Ahoniemi, Suomea koskevat uudet ei-sotilaalliset turvallisuusuhkatekijät, Strategian tutkimusselosteita, julkaisusarja 2, n:o 5 (Helsinki, Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, 1999), 21-22.

²³ Ahoniemi, 16.

²⁴ Peter Stenlund and Marja Nissinen, "A Northern Dimension for the Policies of the European Union," available from <http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/northdim2.html>; Internet; accessed 5 February 2001.

²⁵ Pekka Visuri, "Turvallisuuspoliittinen tulevaisuutemme," Kylkirauta, January 2001, 11.

²⁶ Ari Puheloinen, Russia's Geopolitical Interests in the Baltic Area, Finnish Defence Studies (Helsinki, National Defence College, 1999), 58.

²⁷ Keith Bush, "Putin's Foreign Policy: Four viewpoints," available from <<http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ex004.html>>; Internet; accessed 29 January 2001.

²⁸ Bush.

²⁹ GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) Group was formally founded five years ago as a political, economic and strategic alliance designed to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of these former Soviet Union republics. More information is available in Internet from <<http://www.guuam.org>>.

³⁰ Alexander Rahr, "What Awaits Russia and the EU in the 21st Century? A German Reaction to Putin's Presidency," 6 January 2000; available from <<http://www.csis.org/ruseura/cs000106Rahr.html>>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2000.

³¹ "Venäjä vaatii Itävaltaa pysymään puolueettomana," 29 January 2001; available from <<http://wnet.suomi.net/kaleva>>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2001.

³² "Putin Meets Swedish Prime Minister. Eyes Better EU Ties," 28 September 2000; available from <<http://www.reuters.com>>; Internet; accessed 28 September 2000.

³³ Janusz Bugajski, "Strengthening Security in Europe/Eurasia," 15 November 1999; available from <<http://www.CSIS.org/ee/research/sp991115security.html>>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2000.

³⁴ "Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia," 4 June 1999; available from <<http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/en/misc/8199en.html>>; Internet; accessed 22 September 2000.

³⁵ "Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia,"

³⁶ Petersberg Tasks were originally defined at the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Bonn 1992. These task include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management including peace making. Further in 1997 these tasks were included into the Treaty of the European Union, Amsterdam Treaty, on the initiative of Finland and Sweden.

³⁷ "Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia,"

³⁸ "Council Report to the European Council on the Implementation of the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia," 14 June 2000; available from <<http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/main.cfm?LANG=1>>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2001.

³⁹ Euroopan turvallisuuskehitys ja Suomen puolustus, 32-33.

⁴⁰ "Government Programme. Programme of Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen's Second Government," 15 April 1999; available from <<http://www.vn.fi/vn14e.html>>; Internet; accessed 22 September 2000.

⁴¹ "Government Programme."

⁴² "Government Programme."

⁴³ "Government Programme."

⁴⁴ Esko Seppänen, "EU:ta militarisoidaan ja muokataan liittovaltioksi," 25 September 2000; available from <<http://www.helsinginsanomat.fi/uutiset/juttu.asp?id=20000925AJ4&pvm=200000925>>; Internet; accessed 1 October 2000.

⁴⁵ Olli Kivinen, "Kaksi ulkopoliittikan linjaa," 11 May 2000; available from <<http://www.helsinginsanomat.fi/uutiset/juttu.asp?id=20000511AJ5&pvm=200000511>>; Internet; accessed 1 October 2000.

⁴⁶ Erkki Tuomioja, "EU-puolustuksen kiire huolestuttaa," 21 March 2000; available from <<http://www.helsinginsanomat.fi/uutiset/juttu.asp?id=20000321ul11&pvm=200000321>>; Internet; accessed 1 October 2000.

⁴⁷ Pirjo Kukko-Liedes, "Rusi syyttää Koivistoa," 10 October 2000; available from <<http://www.kaleva.fi/cgi-bin/weblehti.exe>>; Internet; accessed 10 October 2000.

⁴⁸ "President Halonen sees Finnish Policy toward Russia as a Model for the EU," 1 September 2000; available from <<http://www.helsinki-hs.net/news.asp?id=20000901xx2&pvm=20000901>>; Internet; accessed 1 October 2000.

⁴⁹ Tapani Niitynperä and Martti Haavisto, "Olemme viimeiset mohikaanit, joilla on yleinen asevelvollisuus ja alueellinen puolustusjärjestelmä," Sotilasaikakauslehti, August 2000, 10-12.

⁵⁰ In the Western political terminology the policy of adopting Soviet opinions was named Finlandizierung or Finlandization. The tone of the expression during the Cold War era was less favorable towards Finland.

⁵¹ "The North Atlantic Treaty ("Treaty of Washington")," 4 April 1949; available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm>>; Internet; accessed 1 February 2001.

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